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REFORMING SOFTWARE PATENTS1
Colleen Chien2
Abstract
While many believe the patent system has hit a historic and unprecedented low,
discontent with patents is nothing new. In 1966, a Presidential Commission recommended
prohibiting software patents because of the PTO’s inability to vet them. In 1883, the Supreme
Court railed against “speculative schemers who make it their business to watch the advancing
wave of improvement and gather its foam in the form of patented monopolies, which enable
them to lay a heavy tax.” In 1836, the Ruggles Report documented how lax patent standards,
“encourag[ed] fraudulent speculators in patent rights, deluging the entire country with worthless
monopolies, and laying the foundation for endless litigation.” In short, the problems that now
confront the patent system are well-known. What is less well-known, however, is that many of
the very reforms being considered - abolishing certain types of patents, fee-shifting, and an
increasing maintenance fees for example - have been called for and in many cases tried before,
under similar and different conditions. In fact, agrarian design patents were “abolished,”
according to a recent historical account, but by tweaking the standard for granting a design
patent, rather than by outlawing patents relevant to a specific industry. Fee-shifting has been the
norm in many European countries and in certain US contexts – and the theory and evidence
indicate that it works best when low-odds cases can be identified ahead of time and the loser is
not judgment proof – predicates that, given the unpredictability of patent litigation and the use of
shell companies to bring patent litigation, cannot always be satisfied. During this historic
moment, what can the past teach the present and the future about how to solve the software
patent crisis? Based on my research, quite a lot. History teaches away from broad based
legislative reform and towards, narrowly tailored, incremental reform. For example rather than
trying to enact an independent invention defense, patent reformers could consider bolstering
protection for users, which are in some situations protected in other countries and in the US in
the case of medical method patents, by encouraging courts to stay cases brought against them
rather than the manufacturer. Rather than pushing for new changes to the law, patent targets
could pool information and prior art and capture economies of scale in taking advantage of the
multiple ways a patent can be challenged after issuance. These and other suggestions and
available historical and empirical evidence about what has been tried, what has worked, and what
has not, are detailed in this paper.
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INTRODUCTION
The patent system is in crisis. Though supposed to “promote the progress of [] the useful
arts,” the patent system is routinely now blamed for doing the opposite. The increasingly
widespread, legal practice of buying or developing patents and using them for assertion and
licensing,4 rather than for making products5 (“patent trolling”) is typically blamed.
3

These developments have led the mainstream press and lawmakers to compare patent
enforcement to “shakedown” efforts by organized criminals.6 Patent trolling is now being seen as
a business model to be outlawed, or at least regulated.7 Proposals to abolish software patents
have become mainstream,8 and patent holders have been excoriated in the halls of Congress for
suing technology users like the Red Cross for soliciting charitable contributions on the Internet9
and going after companies like Costco and McDonald’s.10 Patent wars between competitors have
raised a host of other issues. In 2012, Google spent $12.5B to buy Motorola Mobility and its
patents,11 and $5.2B in 2011 on R&D.12 In 2011, Apple spent $2.4B on R&D13 but contributed
3

See U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 8.
For example, Colleen Chien, NPEs and the ND California, Address at the Northern District of California Judicial
Conference 9 (April 26, 2012), (reporting data provided by RPX Corp. that indicates that 55% of new suits from
January 1, 2012 to April 8, 2012 have been brought by companies that do not practice their patents – non-practicing
entities (“NPEs”)).
5
Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem and Its Implications for the
Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 328 (2010) (PAEs are “entities . . . focused on the enforcement, rather than
the active development or commercialization of their patents.”), accord, FTC The Evolving IP Marketplace:
Aligning Patent Notice and Remedies with Competition 8 n.5 (Mar. 2011), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/110307patentreport.pdf. Unlike the more popular term “NPE,” “PAE” excludes
startups and others who seek to commercialize their technology.
6
See, e.g., Ryan Davis, Cisco, Others Tell Lawmakers to Keep NPEs Out of ITC, Law360 (July 18, 2012),
http://www.law360.com/ip/articles/360428?nl_pk=bbc3d26f-4bfd-4165-97b0226125cbf024&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=ip (quoting Rep. Zoe Lofgren as
referring to patent enforcement as a “shakedown situation.”), see also remarks of Chris Sacca in This American Life,
Episode 441: When Patents Attack! transcript available at http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radioarchives/episode/441/transcript.
7
Introductory remarks of Representative Goodlatte, Hearing on the ITC and Patent Disputes before the House of
Representatives Judiciary Committee on Intellectual Property, Competition, and the Internet Subcommittee. July 18,
2012 <add link to transcript when available> <add parenthetical re: same>.
8
See, e.g., Oversight of the United States Patent and Trademark Office: Implementation of the Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act and International Harmonization Efforts, Comments of Sen. Dianne Feinstein, June 20, 2012
<add link, parenthetical to same>.
9
157 CONG. REC. H4480, H4496 (Statement of Rep. Crowley) (legislative history in the House of the America
Invents Act), available at http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/20110623-debate_hr_1249_h4480-h4505.pdf.
(hereinafter referred to as “House AIA History.”) Ziarno v. Am. Red Cross, No. 99 C 3430 (N.D. Ill. June 28, 2001).
10
House AIA History, supra note ___ at H4496 (statement of Rep. Grimm). See, e.g., Kelora Systems, LLC v.
Target Corporation et al., (N.D. Cal., Aug. 29, 2011, C 11-02284 CW LB) 2011 WL 6000759 (Costco); GeoTag
Inc v. Starbucks Corp et al., No. 2:10-cv-00572-TJW (McDonald’s).
11
Google Official Blog, We’ve acquired Motorola Mobility, http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2012/05/weveacquired-motorola-mobility.html (last visited May 24, 2012); Jenna Wortham, Google Closes $12.5 Billion Deal to
Buy Motorola Mobility, New York Times (May 22, 2012), available at
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/22/google-closes-12-5-billion-deal-to-buy-motorola-mobility. Google has
since said that of the $12.5B, $5.5were for patents, see Phil Goldstein, Google: Motorola’s Patents Worth $5.5B,
Fierce Wireless (July 25, 2012), available at http://www.fiercewireless.com/story/google-motorolas-patents-worth55b/2012-07-25.
4
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more, approximately $2.6B, to a single transaction to buy patents from Nortel.14
The patent system, it seems, has hit a historic low, at least in the public eye.
Yet discontent with patents is nothing new. In 2006, Justices of the Supreme Court
criticized the use of patents “to charge exorbitant fees” of productive companies.15 In 1994, at
hearings held by the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), software patents were described by a
startup executive as “defensive and an infuriating waste of our technical talent and financial
resources.”16 Most programmers that testified about software patents testified against them.17 In
1967, a Presidential Commission opposed granting software patents because of the PTO’s
inability to vet them.18
Fears that patents are hurting, rather than helping, innovation go back further. In 1883,
the Supreme Court railed against “speculative schemers who make it their business to watch the
advancing wave of improvement and [] lay a heavy tax.”19 Five years before that, Senator
Christiancy complained to Congress about “patent-sharks [who][] procure an assignment of [a][]
useless patent, and at once proceed to levy black-mail [] upon any man who has ever
manufactured or sold, or even used, the later and valuable invention; and hundred[s], at least,
among the innocent users, choose to compromise rather than run the risk of ruin from lawsuits; []
millions are thus filched and extorted from the people every year.”20 In 1836, the Ruggles Report
12

Google, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), (Jan 26, 2012), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312512025336/d260164d10k.htm (reporting an R&D
expenditure of $5.2B in 2011). [update with 2012 data if available pre-publication]
13
Apple, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), (Oct. 26, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/320193/000119312511282113/d220209d10k.htm (reporting an R&D
expenditure of $2.4B in fiscal year 2011 (ending September 30, 2011)).
14
Apple, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), (July 20, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/320193/000119312511192493/d10q.htm (“On June 27, 2011, the
Company, as part of a consortium, participated in the acquisition of Nortel’s patent portfolio for an overall purchase
price of $4.5 billion, of which the Company’s contribution will be approximately $2.6 billion.”).
15
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396, 126 S.Ct. 1837, 1842 (2006) (Kennedy concurrence
(joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer)).
16
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PUBLIC HEARING ON USE OF THE PATENT SYSTEM TO PROTECT
SOFTWARE-RELATED INVENTIONS AT SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA -- JANUARY 26-27, 1994, 48 (1994), available at:
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/hearings/software/sanjose/sjhrng.pdf [hereinafter SAN JOSE HEARING].
17
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PUBLIC HEARING ON USE OF THE PATENT SYSTEM TO PROTECT
SOFTWARE-RELATED INVENTIONS AT ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA -- FEBRUARY 10-11, 1994 (1994), available at:
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/hearings/software/arlington/vahrng.pdf [hereinafter VIRGINIA HEARING] [the
SAN JOSE HEARING and the VIRGINIA HEARING will be referred to collectively as SOFTWARE PATENT HEARINGS], at
90-91. Commissioner Bruce Lehmann stated: “There is no question about it that the lawyers seem to very much in
favor of patent protection. Companies tend to be somewhat split, and programmers who've testified, though not all, a
majority of them have testified against it.” Accord, independent analysis “SW Patent Hearings Sorted.xls” (finding
that only 2 out of 13 software engineers testified in favor of software patents).
18
THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, “TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF . . . USEFUL ARTS, at
21, Report to the Senate Judiciary Committee, S. Doc. No. 5, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (GPO 1967). (“The Patent Office
now cannot examine applications for programs because of the lack of a classification technique and the requisite
search files. Even if these were available, reliable searches would not be feasible or economic because of the
tremendous amount of prior art being generated. Without this search, the patenting of programs would be
tantamount to mere registration.”).
19
Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192, 200, 2 S.Ct. 225, 231 (1883).
20
8 CONG. REC. 307-308 (1878) (Statement of Sen. Christancy).
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documented how lax patent standards, “encourag[ed] fraudulent speculators in patent rights,
deluging the entire country with worthless monopolies, and laying the foundation for endless
litigation.”21 American patent nuisance lawsuits date back to the early 1790s.22 In 1601, British
parliamentarians complained excessively about “royal monopolies”23 in the House of
Commons.24
Thus, many of the problems, real or perceived, that currently confront the patent system
are familiar and well-known. In both modern and historical times, large numbers of colorably
infringed patents, oftentimes held by entities that do not make products, have been asserted
against users and makers of technology. Less well-known, however, is that many of the very
reforms which are now being proposed have been called for and in many cases tried before, in
response to both similar and different conditions.
For example, those dissatisfied with the current patent system have recently demanded
shifting costs to losing plaintiffs,25 creating an independent invention defense,26 and the end of
software patents.27 Not for the first time. Beginning in the 1880s, farmer groups lobbied for the
creation of an innocent user defense, fee-shifting provisions that would deter frivolous claims,
and eliminating certain patents, all in response to demands made by patent-holders of agrarian
patents.28
Patent reformers also now press for reducing damages29 and increasing the fees patent
owners must pay to keep their patents active,30 effectively reducing their term.31 Just like in the
late 1800s, when railroad companies sued en masse by patent purchasers in the pushed to change
how damages were calculated and impose renewal fees on granted patents.32
Recent and related history and experiences are also instructive. In the past decade,
Congress and the PTO have extensively regulated business method patents.33The courts and
Congress have changed nearly every aspect of patent law – its remedies, procedure, and
substance.34 Nuisance lawsuits date back to Justinian times,35 and in the US, efforts to curb
21

Senate Report Accompanying Senate Bill No. 239, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. (April 28, 1836).
Described in Robert P. Merges, The Trouble With Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking, And Patent Law Reform, 24
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583, 1592 (2009). Many of the problems were related to the registration - rather than
examination - based system in place at the time.
23
As patents were called then.
24
Thomas B. Nachbar, Monopoly, Mercantilism, and Intellectual Property 91 Va. L. Rev. 1313 (2005) at *20-21.
25
E.g. through the introduction of the 2012 SHIELD Act, described infra, at Section ___.
26
Described infra, at Section ___.
27
Described infra, at Section ___.
28
Described infra, at Section ___.
29
See, e.g., FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND
REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION Chapter 4 (2011) (describing and advocating for the continued evolution of damages
law in order for the judicial remedy “to replicate the market reward”).
30
See, e.g., proposals from Gerard Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of
Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1813, 1836-37 (2007) (describing increased maintenance fees as a
“dormancy tax”) and others, infra at Section ___.
31
See, e.g. www.defendinnovation.org (advocating that software patents be limited to a five-year term).
32
Described infra, at Section __.
33
Described infra, at Section __.
34
Described infra, at Section ___.
22
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perceived litigation abuses, primarily in tort law, have been ongoing for decades.36
Some of these efforts have worked, others have failed. But virtually every idea currently
proposed has been tried before, in some version. Collectively, these historic and more recent
efforts, and how they have fared, represent a rich data source of experiments to fix the patent
system. Studying them provides a context for understanding the current situation, why certain
proposals have failed, and which ones are likely to succeed. Upon reflection, they reveal the
different roles institutions have played, in both initiating and implementing reform and a host of
other lessons.
During this historic moment, what can be learned about the nature of the current
technology patent crisis and how to resolve it? Based on the research described below regarding
what has been tried, what has worked, and what hasn’t, I believe, quite a lot. Pausing to reflect
can help policymakers avoid the mistakes the past, illuminate the paths they should be exploring,
and be mindful of current progress. The benefit of hindsight is substantial where, as here, there
are strong parallels between the past and present.
The Federal Circuit’s State Street decision confirming the patentability of business
method patents was decided in 1998. From 2005 to 2012, Congress debated and finally passed a
new patent law,37 and the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit changed many aspects of patent
law. 38 Patent reform in both venues continues.39
According to a recent account, the agrarian patent crisis started when functional design
patents were created by the PTO and Congress around 1869.40 It took about 30 years for this
patent crisis to develop and resolve, through a combination of PTO and legislative acts.41 There
was a significant push for railroad patent reform around the same time. About twelve years
elapsed between two seminal patent cases42 that set and changed the balance of power involving
35

See Werner Pfennigstorf, The European Experience With Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 37
(1984) (describing the origins of fee-shifting rules in Europe and frivolous litigation in the Justinian era, around 400
A.D.). See also Robert P. Merges, The Trouble With Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking, And Patent Law Reform, 24
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583, 1592 (2009). According to Robert Merges, nuisance patent lawsuits in the U.S. date
back to the late 1790s, when patents were in effect registered rather than examined.
36
See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey Miller, The English vs. The American Rule on Attorneys Fees: An
Empirical Study of Attorney Fee Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies’ Contracts (November 9, 2010), NYU Law
and Economics Research Paper No. 10-52, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1706054. See also Ronen
Avraham, and John Golden, From PI to IP: Yet Another Unexpected Effect of Tort Reform (July 12, 2012). U of
Texas Law, Law and Econ Research Paper No. 211. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1878966 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1878966 (discussing the parallels between tort reform and patent reform and the
dynamic of same.)
37
Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part I of II, 21 Fed. Cir. B.J. 435
(2012), (Part I), at 438 available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2064740.
38
Described infra, at Section __.
39
Described infra, at Section ___.
40
Described in Magliocca , Barnyards, supra note __ at 1820-21, and infra, Section___.
41
Id.
42
Sayles v. Chicago and NW Ry Co., 21 F. Cas. 600 (1871), aff’d by Railway Company v. Sayles, 99 U.S. 554, 556–
57 (1878) (affirming a pro-patentee doctrine for deciding damages, the doctrine of savings), and Atlantic Works v.
Brady, 107 U.S. 192 (1883), 199–200 (in dicta, condemning “speculative schemers” who used “patented
monopolies[] to lay a heavy tax upon the industry of the country without contributing anything to the real
advancement of the art.”).
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disputes between railroads and the patent holders that demanded royalties from them.
To be sure, historical and modern eras differ. In the late 1800s, the Patent Office played a
substantive policy-making role,43 the International Trade Commission (ITC) was not a major
patent venue,44 and competitors tended not to engage in sustained patent wars. There was no
Federal Circuit.45
But the similarities are striking. Each patent crisis evolved in part in response to a surge
in patenting46 driven by rapid economic growth in at least part of the economy. Each generated
many thoughtful, substantive proposals to change substantive law that were never enacted. They
all generated great anxiety for specific sectors of the economy; the agrarian and railroad crises
were resolved through changes to the patent system that largely left other sectors of the economy
intact. Much progress was achieved outside the halls of Congress, and in the courts, the PTO,
and through self-help. Applying a lens that is informed by these historical lessons provides a
different and constructive view of modern-day reforms. It casts skepticism on broad-based
reforms that are popular but hard to tailor narrowly. It highlights both the need for judicial and
legislative reform and the importance of self-help, including capturing economies of scale,
coordinating strategies and sharing information, and resisting the divide and conquer strategies
of patent speculators, to advance the interests of consumers and companies.
Section I describes three features commonly associated with the current and past patent
crises: (1) too many trivial patents, held by (2) specialized and invulnerable patent plaintiffs (3)
that bring cases for their nuisance value. Section II summarizes the development and resolution
of the agrarian and railroad patent crises. Section III discusses several groups of current
proposals, including: (1) reducing the number of software patents by abolishing them, (2)
bolstering patent defenses through an independent invention defense, and (3) changing the
economics of patent litigation, including through fee-shifting, as well as (4) self-help attempts;
their historical counterparts, and what past experiences can teach.
Section I: What’s the Problem?
The use of patents to extract settlements or exclude competitors is perfectly legal and
nothing new. So is the opportunistic use of patents to accomplish the same aims. Indeed, Robert
Merges cites as historical examples of patent rent-seeking: nuisance suits based on patents after
the 1793 patent act, agricultural patents in the 1860s and 1870s,47 railroad patents of around the
same time, and automobile patents in the early 1900s.48 The rent-seeking comes in the pattern of
43

One example of the PTO’s authority is described in Gerard N. Magliocca, Ornamental Design and Incremental
Innovation, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 845, 850-851 (2003) (recounting successful efforts by the Patent Commissioner to
lobby Congress regarding design patents, with the result that Congress “just deferred.”) the.
44
Not until the ITC was modernized under the 1974 Trade Act did it become so. Described in Chien, Patently
Protectionist? An Empirical Analysis of Patent Cases at the International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & Mary L.
Rev. 63 (2008).
45
The Federal Circuit was created under the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, which merged the United
States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the appellate division of the United States Court of Claims.
46
Described infra, at note ___. [reference the patent numbers and description re: name]
47
Gerard Magliocca’s paper, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of Innovation, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1809 (2007) provides an excellent recent description, drawing upon historical and primary accounts.
48
Merges, supra note___, at 1592-1596.
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assertion: often through the use of older patents,49 in cases in which copying is not alleged, and
based on a technology in which the defendant has already invested considerable resources,
thereby maximizing holdup. Today’s smartphone patent “wars” have been predated by patent
“wars” over airplanes,50 diapers,51 and sewing machines.52 Others have compared the current
disputes over technology patents to historical disputes over telegraph, aircraft, semiconductors,
radio, and 3G cell phone patents.53
Some of these comparisons are inapposite. Smartphone technology, for example is
covered by an estimated 250,000 patents54 and the subject of numerous court battles between a
diverse set of practicing companies, non-practicing entities, competitors, and others around the
world, with diverse stakes and business models.55 The sewing machine patent wars, in contrast,
resolved with a patent pool involving just nine patents and four members.56 The historical
airplane and automobile patent incidents involved single patent “extorters,” namely the Wright
Brothers and George Selden, and their tactics to have their patents extended and applied
broadly.57
Yet two historical precedents have much to offer. In the late 1800’s, according to
49

Cf Hayter, supra note ___, at 62-63 (describing the practice of agrarian patent rings of buying up “old claims, or
‘bottom’ patent,” getting them reissued or continued, and asserting them en masse), Congressional Testimony infra
note ___ (describing same in the railroad context), and Brian Love, supra note ___ (same).
50
Of the early 1900s, described, e.g., in
http://www.centennialofflight.gov/essay/Wright_Bros/Patent_Battles/WR12.htm
51
Of the 1980s, described, e.g., in Fred Warshofsky, THE PATENT WARS (Wiley & Sons 1994), pp. 18-28 (also
discussing the microprocessor and related patent wars)
52
Petra Moser and Ryan Lampe, Do patent pools encourage innovation? Evidence from the 19th-century sewing
machine industry (NBER 2009), (describing the Sewing Machine “Wars” of 1846-1856), at p.7 available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15061.
53
See presentation of David Kappos, at Princeton Conference, Patent Success or Failure, available at
https://citp.princeton.edu/event/patent-success-or-failure/ <the presos aren’t posted yet>
54
RPX Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 59 (Sept. 2, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/1509432/000119312511240287/ds1.htm (“Based on our research, we believe there are
more than 250,000 active patents relevant to today’s smartphones . . . ”).
55
See, e.g., Layne-Farrar, Anne, The Brothers Grimm Book of Business Models: A Survey of Literature and
Developments in Patent Acquisition and Litigation (March 21, 2012), available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2030323 (listing a variety of business models and 24 disputes brought in 4Q2011-1Q2012
in a variety of venues); Florian Mueller, “List of 50+ Apple-Samsung lawsuits in 10 countries”, Foss Patents , Apr.
28, 2012, http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/04/list-of-50-apple-samsung-lawsuits-in-10.html (listing 50+ suits
between Samsung and Apple alone, in multiple venues) (last visited May, 27, 2012). Martin Kenney & Bryan Pon,
Structuring the Smarphone Industry: Is the Mobile Internet OS Platform Key?, 11 J. Ind. Compet. & Trade 239
(2011) (describing the number of players in the smartphone industry and the diversity of their stakes).
56
Ryan Lampe & Petra Moser, Do Patent Pools Encourage Innovation? Evidence from the 19th-Century Sewing
Machine Industry 7, Appendix A (June 8, 2010), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1308997, Singer,
Wheeler & Wilson, Grover & Baker, and Elias Howe were its members).
57
See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839,
889–90 (1990). Similarly, the “Telephone patent war” that some have tried to compare to the current situation
focused on two patents held by inventor Alexander Graham Bell. See Kenneth Lustig, No, the Patent System is Not
Broken, FORBES LEADERSHIP FORUM, Feb. 9, 2012, available at
http://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesleadershipforum/2012/02/09/no-the-patent-system-is-not-broken/ (last visited
May 30, 2012); see also Overland Telephone Company v. American Bell Telephone Company, 126 U.S. 1 (1888).
In contrast to reforming the patent system generally, patent “reform” efforts were focused on addressing problematic
patents specifically, for example by opposing extensions to their terms.
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Congressional record and historical accounts, the patenting of agricultural tools produced a
“flood” of patents until “practically every device or tool that the farmer had” was covered by a
patent.58 Patents covered “the most insignificant things” and there were “so many patents to
different people on the same article” that “farmers had neither the time, money, nor skill ‘to
wade through the vast labyrinth’” of patent rights.59 Patentees sold their patents to patent
“royalty agents” that would demand fees from farmers,60 who, due to their lack of experience
with patent law, financing, and access to skillful representation61 were easier to collect from than
manufacturers and more willing to pay royalty fees to escape costly litigation.62 Patents were
also used anticompetitively by patent “rings,” groups of manufacturers that controlled various
essential articles and used various tactics to get their patents reissued with broadened scope.63
They used their patents to “drive out competitors by compelling them either to sell or assign their
patents or pay a royalty fee for every article manufactured.”64
During the same era, according to the chief historian of this period in patent history
Steven Usselman, the railroad industry was “besieged” by lawsuits brought by “avaricious patent
agents”65 who bought up patents.66 Railroad managers themselves initially sought few patents,
not because they did not innovate but because the industry was “so dynamic that railroad
managers assumed they would profit more from the open exchange of technical information than
they would by securing exclusive rights to specific inventions.”67 This led to extensive
infringement, sometimes willful.68 Companies were taken by surprise as the increasing
complexity of railroad technology exposed them to lawsuits over their use of technology “that
they had assumed either had become generic or were covered by patents for which they had paid
a nominal fee.”69

58

Earl W. Hayter, The Patent System and Agrarian Discontent, 1875-1888, 34 MISS. VALLEY HIST’L. REV. 1 (1947)
59, 61.
59
Id., at 63.
60
Id., at 61.
61
Id., at 64.
62
Id., at 61.
63
Id. at 62 (citing Arguments before the Committee on Patents, Senate Miscellaneous Documents, No. 50, 45 Cong.,
2 Sess., 362-63; Prairie Farmer, XLIV (1873), 297; Buck, Granger Movement, 118-19).
64
Id. at 63. See also id. at 65 (citing some farmers were subjected to multiple royalty demands on the same tool.).
65
Steven W. Usselman and Richard R. John, Patent Politics: Intellectual Property, the Railroad Industry, and
the Problem of Monopoly, 18 J. Policy Hist. 96, 99 (2006); STEVEN W. USSELMAN, REGULATING RAILROAD
INNOVATION: BUSINESS, TECHNOLOGY, AND POLITICS IN AMERICA, 1840-1920, at 116 (2002) [hereinafter
REGULATING RAILROAD] (describing the activities of patent dealers Chittenden and Sayles who bought up patents
and sued a whole industry based on them in particular).
66
“There is now growing up a class of men in the country who, when they find an invention in successful use, go to
the Patent Office and rake over all the patent files to see if they can find an old patent which will supersede the later
successful one, and then buy it up for a mere nominal sum. After obtaining a reissue, if needed, they commence an
onslaught on legitimate business.” U.S. Senate, Arguments before the Committees on Patents of the Senate and the
House of Representatives in Support of and Suggesting Amendments to Bills (S. 300 and H.R. 16I2) to Amend the
Statutes in Relation to Patents, and for Other Purposes, 45th Cong., 2d Sess., miscellaneous document no. 50, 304
[hereinafter Arguments before the Committees] (statement of Mr. Hyde).
67
Id. at 104. While railroads did not compete on patents, they did compete on other government-granted privileges
over, for example, particular rights of way.
68
Id. at 106-107. (“[i]f a patentee asked for an unreasonable price or there was a dispute over priority between
multiple patentees, the railroads were more than willing to refuse any fee and simply infringe the patent.”).
69
Id. at 105.
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Modern and historic suits also had similar motivations. These days, patent assertion
entities serve a market need by overcoming the obstacles to patent monetization and providing a
“path to liquidity” for invention assets.70 The growth in railroad litigation was fueled in large part
by the challenges faced by independent inventors in getting support for their inventions, due to
the sophistication and built-in advantages of the railroads. For example, “[i]f railroad managers
detected a conflict between two patented inventions, they might refuse to purchase either one,
confident they could fend off an infringement suit by contending that the ownership of the
product or process in question remained in dispute.”71
While distinct, the patent disputes over agrarian, railroad, and modern technology patents
present a common story, that a practice and an industry has formed to exploit three basic facts:
A. Pervasive and Inadvertent Infringement of Patents Covering the Basic Building Blocks of the
Economy
The patenting of incremental inventions, historically and recently, has led to inadvertent
infringement across industries that make and use technology. There are now a growing number
of software and computer patents.72 Many cover small improvements to the basic building blocks
of commerce. Individuals and companies have recently been sued over their use of social
media,73 internet solicitations,74 and pop-up advertising.75 A century ago, railroads were sued
over paints, lubricants, office machinery, and electrical equipment.76 Basic farm tools were
covered by numerous patents; according to a historical account, “there were as many as 20
patents on an ordinary coal stove, 647 on a corn planter, 378 on a corn sheller, and 6,211 on the
different parts of a plow.”77 The result in each case: pervasive and inadvertent infringement of
patents that cover the basic building blocks of the economy, by businesses that make and use
technology. There has also historically been systemic underenforcement, due to the high cost of
assertion by practicing entities.78 The sheer number of patents has made certain market-based

70

Described, e.g., in Chien, Of Trolls, supra note __, at 108.
Usselman and John, supra note ___at 105.
72
For modern patent proliferation, see Figure 1. Historically: “By the end of the Civil War, the number of railroadspecific patents had increased from fifty per year to more than five hundred.” Usselman and John, supra note __, at
104. Hayter, supra note __, at 61 (documenting the increase in agricultural patents from 400 in 1863 to 1800 in
1866).
73
EveryMD v. Rick Santorum, Mitt Romney, Newt Gingrich, et al., No. CV12-01623 (C.D. Cal. filed Feb. 27, 2012),
available at http://www.patentlyo.com/files/everymdcomplaintasfiled022712-1.pdf.
74
Ziarno v. Am. Red Cross, No. 99 C 3430 (N.D. Ill. June 28, 2001).
75
Stephanie Olsen, Patent owner stakes claim in Net ad suit, CNET NEWS, Jan. 7, 2004, http://news.cnet.com/21001024_3-5136909.html (last visited May 28, 2012).
76
Usselman and John, supra note ___, at 104.
77
See Hayter, infra note, ____, at 63, FN 13. (“It was claimed there were as many as 20 patents on an ordinary coal
stove, 647 on a corn planter, 378 on a corn sheller, and 6,211 on the different parts of a plow.”) (citing 8 CONG. REC.
at 269, 307, 1372.).
78
Described, e.g., in Chien, Predicting Patent Litigation, 90 Tex. L.Rev. 283, 291- (2011) (HENRY
CHESBROUGH, EMERGING SECONDARY MARKETS FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: US AND JAPAN
COMPARISONS 31 (2006) (citing David J. Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for
Integration, Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy, 15 RES. POL’Y 285 (1986)), available at
http://www.inpit.go.jp/blob/katsuyo/pdf/download/H17esm-e.pdf.
71
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solutions, such as patent clearance79 economically unfeasible.

Figure 1: 2001-2011 US Patent Software Applications
(Keywords: “Computer” and “Software” in the Spec)

Source: Author Analysis, Using Cambia’s PatentLens
B. Specialized and Invulnerable Patent Plaintiffs
In both historical and contemporary times, patent plaintiffs have enjoyed the benefits of
specialization. Modern patents have been transferred to outside entities that do not practice
them.80 Likewise agricultural inventors transferred patents to “royalty agents,” who split the
proceeds from assertion with them.81 This revenue-sharing model has been used by modern
patent assertion entities (PAEs) such as Acacia82 that focus wholly on the monetization of patents
79

Described, e.g., in Chien, Predicting Patent Litigation, 90 Tex. L.Rev. 283 (2011). See also James Bessen &
Michael J. Meurer, Lessons for Patent Policy from Empirical Research on Patent Litigation, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 1 (2005).
80
Described, e.g. in Chien, Arms Race, supra not __, at Abstract.
81
Hayter, supra note ___, at 61 (“They could either collect damages from producers for infringing their patents,
which they seldom chose to do, for litigation with corporations was expensive, or they could take the other
alternative and collect royalty fees from purchasers. Since these articles were purchased by farmers who were much
easier to collect from than manufacturers, the royalty agents began to visit the rural areas during the period under
discussion.”).
82
Acacia Research Group LLC, 2012 Presentation, available at
http://acaciatechnologies.com/ACTGPresentation1stQtr2012.pdf, p.5 (last visited May 28,2012) (stating “Acacia
partners with patent owners (50/50)”).
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rather than the commercialization of technology. Past railroad suits were brought by inventors as
well as “patent speculators.”83 In an incident eerily reminiscent of the public statement of
embarrassment by a Yahoo! engineer that his former employer was suing Facebook in 2012,84 a
railroad company issued a “contrite” apology that its patent had fallen into the hands of a patent
dealer, to those threatened with litigation over it, in 1869.85
In both eras, patent “speculators” have turned being out of the market into an
advantage.86 Unlike companies who sell products, specialized plaintiffs are invulnerable to
counter accusations of infringement, distractions from the core business, and reputational and
brand damage among consumers. PAEs and patent speculators don’t have to abide by industry
norms which have traditionally favored patent stalemate rather than war.87 By focusing solely on
patent assertion, PAEs can enjoy economies of scale88 and reduce the risks of assertion including
through financing mechanisms89 built, for example, around contingency fee lawyers.90 While
practicing companies typically want freedom to operate, patent assertion entities enjoy freedom
to litigate, and therefore gain leverage by pursuing high-stakes injunctions and damages.
When practicing companies sue competitors opportunistically, they may also enjoy have
special advantages, for example “ultra powerful” standards essential patents. In the late 1800s,
suits by George Westinghouse based on patents over his air-brakes, which quickly became an
industry standard, “deeply troubled” policymakers.91 The infringement may be unavoidable:
recently, both houses of Congress held hearings addressing the potentially unfair use of patents

83

U.S. Senate, "Arguments Before the Committees on Patents of the Senate and the House of Representatives in
Support of and Suggesting Amendments to Bills (S. 300 and H.R. 16I2) to Amend the Statutes in Relation to
Patents, and for Other Purposes," 45th Cong., 2d sess., miscellaneous document no. 50, 79 (Mr. Hyde).
84
Andy Baio, A Patent Lie: How Yahoo Weaponized My Work, WIRED EPICENTER, Mar. 13, 2012,
http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2012/03/opinion-baio-yahoo-patent-lie/ (last visited May 28, 2012).
85
REGULATING RAILROAD, supra note __, at 116, FN 61 (Had this transfer been avoided “he certainly would have
granted permission to use the device without charge throughout the system.”).
86
In other words, the business model of “Being Infringed,” see Markus G. Reitzig, Joachim Henkel, and Christopher
Heath, On Sharks, Trolls, and Other Patent Animals - 'Being Infringed' as a Normatively Induced Innovation
Exploitation Strategy, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=885914.
87
See Chien, Arms Race (describing the historic patent peace that has prevented companies from driving each other
out of business with patents, even though they probably could).
88
See Chien, Forbes (2011) (“They sue multiple defendants at the same time. They use the same patents over and
over again. They show up in the same courtrooms, using the same set of counsel. Trolls capture economies of scale
in litigation, and lower their committed capital by using contingent fee lawyers. Though trolls don’t make anything,
this may be their real “product:” a safer, cheaper way to monetize patents.”).
89
Id. Chien. Forbes (2011); see also Tom Ewing. Introducing the patent privateers, IAM Magazine, Jan/Feb 2011,
at 31.
90
For a description of this phenomenon, see William Gallaher, Trademark and Copyright Enforcement in the
Shadow of IP Law (September 2, 2011). Santa Clara Computer and High Technology Law Journal, Vol. 28, 2012,
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1990588; see also Schwartz, David L., The Rise of Contingent Fee
Representation in Patent Litigation (March 23, 2012). Alabama Law Review, Forthcoming, available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1990651.
91
Usselman and Richard, supra note ___ at 108, (“The public clamor for air brakes became intense, and legislation
mandating their installation was seriously debated not only in several states but also in Congress. Seizing the
moment, Westinghouse negotiated lucrative air-brake contracts with several large railroads, and sued others for
patent infringement. Westinghouse’s conduct deeply troubled [the Railroad Commissioner].)”
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essential to complying with a standard.92
C. Settlements Driven By the Cost of Avoiding Legal costs and Remedies, Rather Than the
Economic Value of The Patent (“patent nuisance fee economics”)
Historical and modern patentees have also relied on “patent nuisance fee economics,” a
term I use to describe the incentive that exists to assert patents not because they are economically
valuable but because defending against a patent demand can be expensive, and therefore induces
settlement.93 This model takes advantage of the reality that if a lawsuit is threatened or filed, it’s
often cheaper to settle than pay litigation expenses, even if the case appears to be weak.94 If the
asserter has a large patent portfolio, the cost of evaluating it, even for the owner, has been
described as a “a mind-boggling, budget-busting exercise to try to figure [] out with any degree
of accuracy at all.”95 By agreeing to settle, the painful exercise of determining on a patent-bypatent basis what products infringe what patent claims and their validity, as well as the
appropriate royalty, as a court would, can largely, though not completely, be avoided.
In the late 1800s, patent agents demanded payments from farmers for articles the farmers
had purchased or made themselves.96 Thousands of cases were filed on behalf of single
patentees, in venues inconvenient for their targets. In one example, attorneys reportedly prepared
for more than 4,000 cases in Iowa on behalf of a single patentee with the likely result that
“unwary and unsuspecting farmers” would pay the nuisance fee rather than “be dragged one
hundred fifty miles away from their homes, at great inconvenience and expense.”97 Most farmers
were too poor to mount any investigation or defense against the alleged patent rights,98 and
settled.99
“Cost of defense” tactics have been utilized recently as well. In Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar

92

See Senate Judiciary Committee, July 11, 2012 Hearing on “Oversight of the Impact on Competition of Exclusion
Orderes to enforces Standards-essential
Patents,”http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=45dca2a38e7309da19dce3a4cc06b817) ; House
Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Intellectual Property, Competition and the Internet, July 18, 2012 Hearing
on “ "The International Trade Commission and Patent
Disputes”http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/Hearings%202012/hear_07182012.html.
93
Inspired by David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance Value, 5
Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 3 (1985).
94
Two excellent papers that discuss why and how IP lawyers bring cases even when they are weak are: William T.
Gallagher, , Trademark and Copyright Enforcement in the Shadow of IP Law (September 2, 2011), Santa Clara
Computer and High Technology Law Journal, Vol. 28, 2012, and David L. Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee
Representation in Patent Litigation (March 23, 2012), Alabama Law Review, Forthcoming. available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1990651.
95
Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy: Hearing Before the
Fed. Trade Comm'n, supra note __, at 743 (statement of Fred Telecky, General Patent Counsel for Texas
Instruments).
96
Hayter, supra note __, at 65-66.
97
Id. at 68 (describing Arguments before the Committee on Patents, Senate Miscellaneous Documents, No. 50, 45
Cong., 2 Sess., 362-63; Prairie Farmer, XLIV (1873), 297; Buck, Granger Movement, 118-19).
98
Magliocca, Blackberries, supra note ___, at 1824.
99
Id. at 1823-24 (citing 11 CONG. REC. 1973 (1881) (statement of Sen. Voorhees: "The manufacturing company will
stand on its legal rights and go into litigation quite as cheerfully as the other side, while the plain people of the
country shrink from law, and justly so, as they would from contagion, small-pox, or any other great calamity.")).
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Bancorp,100 the Federal Circuit affirmed an award of attorney’s fees in a case that displayed
“‘indicia of extortion’” where a non-practicing entity filed a large number of cases in order to
“exploit[] the high cost to defend complex litigation to extract a nuisance value settlement.” Each
complaint was followed by a “demand for a quick settlement at a price far lower than the cost of
litigation… based on the defendant’s annual sales: $25,000 for sales less than $3,000,000;
$50,000 for sales between $3,000,000 and $20,000,000; and $75,000 for sales between
$20,000,000 and $100,000,000.”101 Judge Davis of the Eastern District of Texas has singled out
“plaintiffs who file cases with extremely weak infringement positions in order to settle for less
than the cost of defense and have no intention of taking the case to trial. Such a practice is an
abuse of the judicial system and threatens the integrity of and respect for the courts.”102
Section II: How the Crises Arose and Resolved in the Past
A. How the Crises Arose
How did the historical crises arise? In the case of agrarian patents, according to a recent
account, in 1869, the start of the agrarian patent crisis was the Patent Office’s creation of a new
kind of design patent that enabled applicants to protect incremental functional designs. The
change was codified by Congress the next year.103 Contemporary accounts blamed the patent
office and its “laxity in administering the law” and practice of granting patents on “trifling
modifications...not entitled to protection.”104 By 1874, groups sympathetic to farmer’s causes
called on Congress to change the law.105
Patent demands became so pervasive that in farmers found that they could not escape the
patent system: “it is in our boots, it is in our clothes, it is in the tools we work with, in the buggy
we ride in, in the harness on the horse, in the whip we strike him with. It is to be found in our
fences, our gates, in our pumps, in our kitchen, in our food, and finally in our coffin.”106
In the case of railroads, the “new economic order” brought by industrial development put
pressure on many governmental institutions, including the patent system. The expanding
economy generated a surge of patent activity that the patent office had a hard time keeping with
and “significantly increasing the success rate of would-be patent holders.” 107 Similar things
could be said of the digital revolution. The growing backlog has recently driven calls for more
PTO fees to be allocated to hiring examiners, rather than diverted to other activities. Just as the
100

Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 653 F. 3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2011), available at
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/opinions-orders/09-1308.pdf.
101
Id. at 1326-1327.
102
Raylon LLC v. Complus Data Innovations, et al., 6:09cv355, 356, 357 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 9, 2011). On the filing of
weak cases in IP cases, see Gallagher, supra note ___, generally. See also Schwartz, Contingent Litigation, supra
note ___ (noting that the strength or weakness of a case is in the eye of the beholders, with plaintiffs and defendants
holding widely divergent views).
103
Magliocca , Barnyards, supra note __ at 1820. See Ex parte Crane, C.D. 7 (1869), reprinted in HECTOR T.
FENTON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR DESIGNS 225 (Philadelphia, Campbell ed. 1889). At the time, the
Patent Office played an expanded role in the patent system. (cite/paraphrase)
104
Hayter, supra note __ at 65-66.
105
Hayter, supra note __ at 77 (describing the National Grange convention) and 78 (discussing other farmer interest
groups).
106
Hayter, supra note __ at 64 (citing an 1879 farmer statement).
107
Usselman and John, supra note___ at 99 (2006).
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large number of patent applications did in the late 1800s.108 Patent demands brought by
practicing companies and patent outsiders alike and high-profile suits involving double-acting
and air brakes, sleeper cars, and a variety of railroad safety equipment caused the railroads great
anxiety and drove them to get organized.
Through their specialized industry groups such as the Eastern and Western Railroad
Associations (the ERA and WRA), the railroads hired patent attorneys and coordinated defense
efforts for the entire industry. These efforts included lobbying Congress and the courts, settling
cases, and other forms of self-help.109
B. How the Crises Resolved
In the name of agrarian patent reform, an innocent user defense was introduced in several
forms to curb the “[harassment of][] people with vexatious suits about that of which they
never could by any possibility have had knowledge.”111 Another amendment would shift fees to
plaintiffs if the economic value of their suit was low or they lost in order to discourage frivolous
suits and end, “wholesale raiding upon innocent people.” 112 Schemes to eliminate injunctive
relief for certain patents and set the licensing rate ex ante, by statute113 or in connection with the
issuance or payment of renewal of patents were also proposed.114 Railroads pressed for a statute
110

108

Id. at 102 (“Patent commissioners grumbled about the financial drain [other priorities] posed: they would have
preferred to use funds to hire more patent examiners.”).
109
Described supra, Section ___.
110
Sen. Windom’s Proposal: “No recovery of damages or costs shall be had against the defendant in any suit
brought for the alleged infringement of a patent by the use of any patented device, process, invention, or discovery,
if it shall appear that the defendant purchased the same for his own private use from the manufacturer thereof or
from a dealer engaged in the open sale of the same, unless it shall also appear that the defendant at the time of such
purchase had knowledge or actual notice of the existence of such patent.” 8 CG 269. An alternative version of this
reform would have eliminated liability for innocent consumers of patented products. The National Grange petitioned
Congress to “amend the patent laws of America as to make the manufacturer or vendor alone responsible for
infringement in the sale of patented articles.” 10 Cong. Rec. 101, 102 (1880) (statement of Sen. Butler introducing
the petition).
111
“Now, the object of this amendment is to prevent the oppression and the great injustice that is being perpetrated
upon hundreds of thousands of innocent people by means of the patent law… I want to free [the user][]from such
harassing and vexatious suits. Give the patentee his full redress against the vender, against the manufacturer, or
against the man who has knowledge of the patent, but do not send him into every farmhouse and cottage in this
country to harass the people with vexatious suits about that of which they never could by any possibility have had
knowledge. That is the object of this amendment.” 8 Cong. Rec 269 (1879).
112
The proposal: “[i]f the plaintiff shall not recover the sum of $20 or over, the court shall adjudge him to pay his
own costs, unless it shall also appear that the defendant at the time of such purchase, manufacture, or practical
application, had knowledge or actual notice of the existence of such patent.” 8 Cong. Rec. 652, 660 (1879). Senator
Windom explained that the purpose of the change would be to “[c]ompel these men to give security for costs and
then inform them that such suits must be conducted at their own expense, and we shall hear no more of wholesale
raiding upon innocent people.” 8 Cong Rec 303 (1879) (Sen. Windom).
113
Senator Christiancy proposed “[t]here is still another class of cases in which, for patents hereafter to be issued, to
prevent extortion, some rate of compensation should be fixed by the statute . . . when the infringement consists in
using the thing patented.” 8 CONG. REC. 291, 308 (1878).
114
“A number of state granges proposed that, when patents were issued or renewed, a definite royalty fee be set and
paid to the patentee; in return for this payment could construct and sell such improved machines and thus bring them
into immediate use.” Hayter, supra note __, at 77. (citing Iowa State Grange, Proceedings, IV (1873), 44-45;
Michigan State Grange, Proceedings, II (1875), 42; Kansas State Grange, Proceedings (Topeka), VIaII (1880), 8).
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of limitations on claims of infringement.115 There was a proposal to adopt European style
renewal fees on granted patents.116 A new way of calculating damages – by using an established
license fee or profits from sales and doing away with a legal principle called the doctrine of
savings – was suggested.117
The railroads and other supporters of patent reform expended significant money and time
to convince Congress to change patent law.118
1. What Didn’t Work: Broad, Substantive Legislative Proposals Across the Patent System
Most of these legislative proposals failed. They failed because, in solving the problems of
farmers and railroads, they would, it was perceived, create problems for other parts of the patent
system. It appeared for example, and rightly so, that “patent reforms brought forth by the railroad
were done for the railroads [sic] self-interest.”119 Likewise, the “hardship” experienced by
farmers was seen “hardly a sufficient justification[] for abolishing that system of patents which
has accomplished so much in this country.”120 Fee-shifting proposals were rejected as unfairly
punishing patentees with lawful claims, but low damages.121 Suggestions to reform damages
were seen as self-serving because few others suffered from the doctrine of savings that the
railroads complained about.122 In addition, they appeared to hinder judges and juries with their
specificity.123
The changes were portrayed as helping large companies, at the expense of small
inventors.124 Individual inventor Thomas Edison claimed that they would “strongly tend to
discourage and prevent the perfection of useful inventions.”125 Companies in other industries
likewise opposed any changes. Their opposition was focused mainly on the isolated nature of
patent shark attacks. Most industries and inventors had nothing to do with patent sharks. As
such, they saw no need to limit their patent rights because of a problem that did not affect them.
In addition, as has been said recently, Congressional change is subject to numerous “veto
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Regulating Railroad, supra note ___, at 145.
Id.
117
Id.
118
Regulating Railroad, supra note ___, at 154-155.
119
U.S. Senate, "Arguments before the Committees on Patents of the Senate and the House of Representatives in
Support of and Suggesting Amendments to Bills (S. 300 and H.R. 16I2) to Amend the Statutes in Relation to
Patents, and for Other Purposes," 45th Cong., 2d Sess., miscellaneous document no. 50, 304 [hereinafter Arguments
before the Committees], at 69.
120
Id.
121
This amendment “would absolutely prevent, practically at least, the bringing of any suit simply to settle the
question of the validity of a patent, or the infringement, where the damages were not considerable.” 8 Cong. Rec.
570 (1879) (Sen. Wadleigh).
122
Usselman, Regulating Railroads, supra note __, at 159.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
See Hayter, supra note __ at 81 (“Thomas. A. Edison, in opposing the bill of 1879, stated in a letter to Butler: "I
am sure that this provision will not only act oppressively upon many inventors, but will strongly tend to discourage
and prevent the perfection of useful inventions by those most fitted for that purpose, and most likely to accomplish
it.... It would be very burdensome to me.") Citing Thomas A. Edison to Butler, February 17, 1879, Butler Papers.
116
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players,” and “legislative priorities are often unduly skewed by political expediency.”126
2. What Did Work: Narrowly-Tailored, Specific Reform
a. Abolishing Agrarian Patents
Where these proposals failed, more tailored changes to the law, accomplished largely
outside of the legislative process, succeeded. A period of confusion during which the Patent
Office “flip-flopped” several times about what should be considered patentable under the design
law followed the change that precipitated the agrarian patent crisis.127 According to legal
historian Gerard Magliocca,“[i]nstability in patent law eventually became a major concern, and
Congress was forced to step in and restore order.”128 Congress codified a stricter standard in
1902.129 The Patent Office applied this more stringent standard, making it harder to get patents
on trivial advances,130 and complaints about patent sharks subsided. Reform took time –thirty
years elapsed prior between the two Congressional amendments that bookended the period of
patent “crisis.”
b. Courts, Self-Help Through Railroad Associations, and Challenging Railroad Patents
In the case of railroad patents, reform was led by the Court and railroad associations
rather than Congress. Though many legislative fixes were proposed, none really succeeded as
“Congress could not accommodate the special concerns of railroads without sacrificing essential
features of a patent system that still functioned quite capably in most segments of the
economy.”131
How, eventually, did the crises abate? According to historical accounts, ourt leadership
and self-help were critical. Supreme Court Justice Joseph P. Bradley, an ex-railroad man himself,
through a series of decisions regulating the railroad industry, has been credited with meticulously
and carefully helping. In Railway Company v. Sayles, he “avoided making any sweeping
pronouncements [][about] the doctrine of savings… instead, honed in on the specific details of
the patent claims []advanced,”132 to invalidate the patents at stake. In other decisions, he ruled for
the patentee, but based on specifics that “kept patent law relatively unencumbered by abstract
principles.”133 However, his views on the patent system became clear in his 1883 Atlantic Works
v. Brady decision, that:
126

Arti Rai, Patent Validity Across the Executive Branch: Ex Ante Foundations for Policy Development 61 Duke
Law J., 1237, 1266 (2012)
127
Gerard N. Magliocca, Ornamental Design and Incremental Innovation, 86 Marq. L. Rev. 845, 878-879 (2003)
(hereinafter “Ornamental Design”).
128
Id., 879.
129
Ornamental Design, supra note __, at 879. See P.L. 57-109; 35 U.S.C. §73 (1902). (by deleting the word “useful”
and spurring the PTO to “taking the hint,” applying a stricter interpretation of patentability.)
130
Ornamental Design, supra note __, at 879.
131
See Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Daniel M. G. Raff and Peter Temin, editors, LEARNING BY DOING IN MARKETS,
FIRMS, AND COUNTRIES, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS (1999), at 76-77. See also Steven Usselman, Patents,
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Usselman, Patent Politics, supra note ___, at 116.
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“To grant a single party a monopoly of every slight advance made, except where the
exercise of invention somewhat above ordinary mechanical or engineering skill is
distinctly shown, is unjust in principle and injurious in its consequences . . .
It was never the object of [the patent] laws to grant a monopoly for every trifling device,
every shadow of a shade of an idea, which would naturally and spontaneously occur to
any skilled mechanic or operator in the ordinary progress of manufacturers. Such an
indiscriminate creation of exclusive privileges tends rather to obstruct than to stimulate
invention.
It creates a class of speculative schemers, who make it their business to watch the
advancing wave of improvement and gather its foam in the form of patented monopolies,
which enable them to lay a heavy tax upon the industry of the country without
contributing anything to the real advancement of the art. It embarrasses the honest
pursuit of business with fears and apprehensions of concealed liens and unknown
liabilities to law suits and vexatious accountings for profits made in good faith.”134
This decision supported the already formidable defense efforts mounted by the major railroad
associations, trade groups that worked to for example, identify relevant prior art, coordinate
responses, and work towards a common goal of providing its members with freedom to
operate.135 These efforts were credited with driving down railroad patent litigation136 and are
described below, in the “self-help” section.
Section III: Implications for Current Proposals
A. Problem-Framing and Designing Patent Reform
Although much has been accomplished with respect to patent reform, great dissatisfaction
remains. As firms watch others make money137 and build firm reinvigoration strategies off of
patents,138 the practice of patent assertion is expected intensify, rather than abate, in the shortterm.139 As quickly as patent institutions have moved to reform the patent system, the market has
arguably moved even faster, introducing new sources of capital, business models, and tactics140
to the business of patent assertion. For these reasons, efforts to reform patents continue, with
134

Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192 (1883), 199–200.
Usselman, Regulating Railroads, supra note ___, at 171-176.
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Usselman, Regulating Railroads, supra note ___, at 174-175.
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For example, through the successful stock prices of well-managed company Acacia, whose approximate value
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http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=ACTG
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For a recent example Mike Masnick, “Early Mobile Internet Company That Failed to Adapt Becomes Patent
Troll,” Tech Dirt (April 18, 2012) http://www.techdirt.com/blog/wireless/articles/20120418/03490318538/earlymobile-internet-company-that-failed-to-adapt-becomes-patent-troll.shtml [add parenthetical]
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In accordance with customary demonstration effects in the patent world, described e.g., in Chien, Arms Race,
supra note ___.
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the Value of Your IP Assets, chair Jose Esteves (describing various financing and legal vehicles for patent
monetization) described at
http://www.pli.edu/Content/Seminar/IP_Monetization_2012_Maximize_the_Value_of/_/N4kZ1z1330y?ID=142943.
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several proposals receiving attention.
Addressing the three problems of too many patents, invulnerable patent defendants, and
patent nuisance fee economics, these proposals include: (1) reducing the number of software
patents including by abolishing them, (2) bolstering patent defenses including through an
independent invention defense, and (3) changing the economics of patent litigation, including
through fee-shifting, as well as (4) self-help attempts; their historical counterparts, and what past
experiences can teach. This section focuses on these and related proposals and the lessons that
can be gleaned from analogous reforms.
How the problem is framed informs the solution. Alternative arguments that the single
“problem” is really the patents (software patents or at least certain software patents), the people
(trolls), or their specific behavior (nuisance tactics), are each convincing. But each category of
“offense” contains a wide variety of practices. Though the claim is often made that most
software patents are trivial and do not promote innovation, there are exceptions. For example, the
PageRank patent, over a search algorithm, arguably enabled search technology to be transferred
from Stanford University to Google.141 Trolls also come in different types. Although all of them,
according to my definition, use patents primarily for litigation and licensing rather than to
support technology transfer and commercialization, they do so in different ways. RPX
Corporation estimates that inventors, who often assert a single or handful of patents comprise
18% of non-practicing entity (NPE) litigants and sue fewer defendants, while “licensing entities”
bring the bulk of suits (69%) and serial NPEs like Acacia bring 15% of them.142 While Acacia is
a high-volume, repeat player in patent assertion, individual inventors are more likely to sue in a
“one-off” capacity.
Each “problem” also yields different solutions, with their own tradeoffs. A way to
consider them is with respect to the common yardsticks of: precision – are they overly broad or
under inclusive; effectiveness – would they operate only on existing patents, future patents, only
litigated patents, or all of the above; and fairness – would they exacerbate existing inequalities
for example that disfavor inventors lacking in resources? What institution implements the reform
matters– improved patent examination impacts only future patents, while courts can in one
decision impact all patents, existing, future, litigated and unlitigated. 143 So do the issues of costs
of implementation and circumvention – how easily can a new rule be circumvented or skirted;
and the?
These and are other concerns inform the analysis below.
B. Proposals to Reduce the Number of Patents
141

See, e.g. Colleen Chien, Race to the Bottom, Intellectual Asset Management Magazine Jan/Feb 2012.
RPX Corporation Analyst Day Presentation, March 8, 2012, at 2, available at
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See David Schwartz, Retroactivity in Patent Law, ____Ala. Law Rev.___ (2012) (Forthcoming), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1945554 (describing the retroactive nature of court decisions and arguing that because
patent lawyers circumvent court decisions through clever drafting, the decisions primarily impact preexisting, rather
than prospective, patents). But see also Arti Rai, Patent Validity Across the Executive Branch: Ex Ante Foundations
for Policy Development 61 Duke Law Journal 101, ____ (2012) (describing how courts are mindful of and try to
limit the retroactive impact of their decisions.)
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1. “Abolish software patents”
If the problem is too many patents, why not eliminate a large class of them, namely
software patents? Software patents have been singled out for elimination due to their perceived
vagueness, low-quality, and non-essential relationship to innovation. As a solution called for by
many quarters,144 to apply specifically to problematic patents rather than to the patent system
generally,145 the idea of abolishing software patents has enormous popular appeal. It also has
historical and recent precedent. According to Gerard Magliocca, “abolishing” agricultural design
patents is what ultimately resolved the agrarian patent crisis.146 The regulation of business
method patents, through the “second pair of eyes” (“SPER”) program, the application of the old
prior user rights defense only to business method patents,147 and the Act’s business method
specific provisions,148 represents a recent attempt to minimize the perceived harms associated
with a certain type of patent.
Each of these experiences contains lessons for how, assuming it is the goal, software
patents might be abolished. Though, it should be noted, the courts seem to be well on their way
to abolishing certain types of software patents already. In Bilski, the Supreme Court rejected the
low bar of having a “useful, concrete, and tangible” result that had been used to police
patentability for over a decade. Applying it, the Federal Circuit has found unpatentable a
software product for detecting internet-based credit card fraud,149 a computer-implemented
method for processing car loan applications,150 a tax-avoiding real estate investment tool reciting
computer-aided steps,151 and computer related financial claims.152 In Prometheus,153 a case
about medical diagnostic methods, the Supreme Court cited precedents about software patents,
made comments about abstract ideas, and, based on the case, sent back to the Federal Circuit for
review a patent over watching an advertisement in order to access copyrighted content over the
internet the appellate court had found valid.154
144
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a. The Definitional Issue
One of the biggest challenges to “abolishing software patents” is the question of what
exactly is a “software patent”? Academics disagree on where the line should be,155 and wherever
the courts or PTO place it,156 practitioners will try to avoid it through clever drafting.157 Many
believe that these realities make for efforts to fit software inventions into permissible or
impermissible categories “pointless.”158
History does not support such a conclusion. For example, it’s arguably as hard to define a
“business method” patent as it is to define a “software” patent. That hasn’t stopped Congress
from regulating “method[s] of doing or conducting business,” through the prior user rights
defense it passed in 1999,159 subdefining business methods through its invalidation of future tax
strategy patents,160 and redefining them as part of the covered business method transitional
program161 of the 2011 America Invents Act.
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Major patent class-based attempts to do so include James Bessen, A Generation of Software Patents, Boston
Univ. School of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 11-31, footnote 68 (2011) ; Hall, Bronwyn H., Adam
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Thus, the definitional issue may be a bit of a red herring– a working definition, rather
than a perfect definition, may be what is really needed to discourage nuisance suits. Congress
has already drawn the business method line several times. The PTO will need to implement the
definition of a “covered business method patent” as part of the AIA’s Section 18 transitional
business method patent program.162 While debates about what should and shouldn’t be in this
definition included continue,163 the PTO’s experience implementing the standard will be
important to observe and learn from.
Notably, Section 18 does not abolish all business method or software patents, but rather
subjects those that fit the definition and are likely invalid to a higher level of scrutiny while
shielding defendants from them. It may just be enough to chill litigation of particularly
problematic patents.
b. Towards a Working Line
If not a perfect line, what would be a working line, to isolate problematic patents?
Regardless of where it drawn, a successful rule would be one that would enable parties to a
licensing discussion to look quickly at a patent and, based on them, agree upon which of its
claims fit the given standard. That question will depend on how consistent the courts or PTO are
in their determinations and the extent to which patentees try to assert patents, by themselves or
en masse, that, though issued under a different standard, are likely now invalid. It’s easy to
argue about one particular patent, but if a whole portfolio is asserted against an entity, the costs
of arguing about each one keep the cost of defense, and therefore the economic opportunity,
high.
c. Circumvention
Even if it were possible to abolish all software patents, nuisance suits are based on other
types of patents as well. In my analysis of troll suits from 2000-2008, I found that a significant
number of patent suits involving hardware.164 Recently, Project Paperless LLC has recently
approached small companies for licenses based on their use of PDF machines in alleged violation
of a patent whose claim 1 recites “a computer data management system” with “at least one
memory,” “at least one processor …” and also mentions a “scanner,” “digital copier”, and
financial product or service, including . . . marketing, customer interfaces, Web site management and functionality,
transmission or management of data, servicing, underwriting, customer communications, and back office
operations—e.g., payment processing, stock clearing.” See 157 CONG. REC. S1364–65 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011)
(statement of Sen. Schumer). One thing that aids in the identification of business method patents is that they are
concentrated around a single class, Class 705. See Matal, supra note ___, at 116. (describing efforts to limit the
definition of “covered business-method patent” to language that tracks the USPTO’s patent class 705). Software
patents, in contrast, are harder to pin down. See John Allison ____ (describing dissatisfaction with the PTO’s classes
and identifying software patents by reading each patent and classifying it based on its description and claims). For
an interesting history of class 705, beginning with its creation in 1997 from the business and cost/price sections of
computer classes 395 and 364, see Gene Quinn, Business Methods by the Numbers: A Look Inside the PTO Class
705, IP Watchdog (January 12, 2012) available at http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/01/22/business-methods-bythe-numbers-a-look-inside-pto-class-705/id=21892/.
162
Id. Matal at ____
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See USPTO website “Changes To Implement Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents” (last
visited August 2, 2012) http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/covered-business-method-comments.jsp.
164
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“digital imaging devices.”165 One can imagine trolls suing based on patents that are less abstract
and more likely to be found patentable than “pure software” patents. There may be less to argue
about with respect to these patents, because you can more easily tell what they cover and there
may be fewer of them. However, where there is a colorable claim based on subject matter that
clears subject matter eligibility standards, the business opportunity will remain.
Potentially anticipating this, a recently advanced Congressional bill defines “software
patent” broadly, to encompass hardware and software patents.166 However it may go too far and
beyond its drafters’ intent. By including any process that “could be” implemented on a computer
regardless of whether a computer is specifically mentioned in the patent, most if not all modern
process patents that involve any sort of computation would be implicated.
d. How Abolishment Was Accomplished
The historical experience lends insight into what it means to “abolish” a certain type of
patent or patent lawsuit. In the case of agricultural design patents, their “abolishment” was not
achieved through any change to section 101. Rather, it was accomplished by making the low bar
that applies to design patents no longer apply to patents covering functional farm tools.167 In that
way it was more akin to raising the obviousness standard – farm patents could still be obtained,
but only if they met the higher, utility patent, standard. Thus, there are limits to a comparison
between abolishing “trivial” agricultural patents and abolishing the entire class of software
patents.
Similarly, in the case of railroad patents, Justice Bradley’s ruling on a set of particular
patents, covering double-acting brakes, and subsequent jurisprudence, including dicta,168 led to a
“’surgical intervention’”169 in the field that produced industry-specific change. The railroads
worked together to invalidate specific patents that were asserted against them, in contrast to the
abolishment of an entire class of patents.170
2. Tweaking Obviousness
As just discussed, the agrarian example suggests that another way to reduce the number
of patents is to the raise the bar and ensure that the scope of protection is commensurate to the
patentee’s contribution. This approach has been used other times in history. Indeed, the
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movement away from a registration-based system in 1836171 and the rise of peripheral claiming
in the 1940s and 1950s172 were prompted by such concerns.173
Throughout history, the Supreme Court has redefined obviousness standards.174 In 2007,
the Supreme Court decided KSR v. Teleflex in which it made it easier to find an invention
obvious. Before KSR, the Patent Office needed to find a “teaching, suggestion, or motivation” in
order to reject a patent as obvious. After KSR, it and courts could rely on many other rationales
for doing so.175 By raising the standard, the Court attempted to distinguish ordinary innovations,
which do not deserve patents, from patentable inventions, which do: “the results of ordinary
innovation are not the subject of exclusive rights under the patent laws. Were it otherwise patents
might stifle, rather than promote, the progress of useful arts.”176
a. KSR’s Impact
Nearly five years have elapsed since the Supreme Court decided KSR. Empirical studies
have confirmed that the decision has, indeed, made a difference, in the expected direction. The
courts are more likely to find invalidate patents as obvious177 and to overturn lower court
findings of non-obviousness. The Federal Circuit are more likely to leave intact findings of
obviousness.178
b. Transaction Costs
The impact of KSR outside of the courtroom and where the vast majority of patent
negotiations take place has been more mixed, however. KSR doesn’t provide a bright line rule to
171
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distinguish obvious from nonobvious inventions. Courts must take into account a “constellation
of factors” that can be proven based on various types of factual evidence regarding what a
POSITA would have thought, and done.179 The inputs as well as the outcomes of this analysis are
uncertain. Academics have questioned the PTO’s ability, within the time and resource constraints
it faces, to apply these factors as intended.180
As one industry insider put it, “because that determination of subjective factors requires
so much research and time [] I don‘t really believe that any of us in the industry really pay a lot
of attention to KSR.”181 Practitioners have echoed these themes, criticizing the decision as taking
away “objectivity, instead supplanting it with a subjective test.”182 While this could change over
time, if it becomes easier to agree upon what inventions fail the standard, these experiences
confirm the difference between judicial and real-world success.
3. Increasing Maintenance Fees
Several have suggested reducing patent numbers by increasing what it costs to keep
patents in force.183 Increasing maintenance fees was also proposed in the late 19th century, for
largely the same reasons:184 it was argued that the grant of a patent “is a tax upon, or a
deprivation to the public, and should not be perpetuated unless it is worth a good price.” 185
Then, as now, patent speculators tended to amass “old patents” to assert them.186 By hiking fees,
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the thinking goes, fewer patents will survive long enough to end up with trolls.187 Several
proposals would increase the amount and frequency of maintenance fees.188 There does seem to
be some room to increase fees. Controlling for wealth, US patent fees are at an all-time low,
“suggesting that the U.S. patent system has never been so affordable. Current fees would need to
increase approximately tenfold to match their 1800 level.”189 Globally, pre- and post-grant fees
per capita in the US are in the lowest 1/3 tier.190
a. Broad-Sweeping Reform
However, changing maintenance fees represents broad-sweeping, rather than tailored
reform. It impacts not only marginal software patents held by trolls, but all others as well –
strong and weak non-software patents, held by startups and large companies, for various reasons.
For example, consider a modest change to the existing system which requires payments to be
made at 3.5, 7.5, and 11.5191 years that would make fees due every year and double them. This
could severely impact small entities and entrepreneurs who are cash-strapped.192 Indeed, critics
of the unsuccessful late 19th century fee reform proposals thought they were ten-fold too large
and did not take into account the realities of inventors, who needed time to test their inventions
before paying fees on them.193
However, carving small entities out from any change in maintenance fees is likely to also
avoid the desired policy result, as it is individuals and small companies that provide the bulk of
patents to PAEs.194 According to data provided by RPX, which buys patents in the marketplace,
over three-quarters of PAE/NPE patents come from small inventors and individuals.195 In
addition, while a modest change is likely to hurt small entities the most, it is unlikely to make a
difference to companies who may pay in the thousands or even millions for a patent, expecting
much greater returns.196 Even if fewer patents end up available for sale, few trolls rely on having
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huge portfolios of patents;197 the limiting factor for most trolls is not usually the number of
patents, but the resources to assert them.
These realities have likely made the proposed PTO fee increases more measured than
they might otherwise be. Section 10 of the America Invents Act gives the PTO the authority to
set fees, in order “to recover the aggregate estimated costs to the Office for processing, activities,
services, and materials relating to patents.” Although it does not cost the PTO anything to
maintain a patent, the PTO is “not required to align individual fees and activity costs on a fee-byfee basis.”198 In its 2012 proposal to reset fees, the PTO boosted large entity maintenance fees
(first to third stages) by 42% (from $1,130 to $1,600), 26% (from $2,850 to $3,600) and 61%
(from $4,730 to $7,600), respectively.199 The rationale for doing so was to rebalance front‐end
and backend fees with policy objectives: “early stage fees are lower in recognition of the
uncertainty of patent value; as time goes on, an inventor can better measure the value of an
invention and determine whether maintenance is truly worthwhile.”200 In its presentation to the
PTO’s advisory board, the Office explained that the suggested fee increase, among other things,
was meant to nudge “the marginal patent into the public domain more quickly.” 201 These are
welcome policy changes that, if enacted, should reduce, though not eliminate the lifetime and
risk presented by marginal patents.
4. Better Patent Examination
If the problem is that there are a lot of low-quality patents, one solution, oft-heard, would
be for the PTO to more strictly apply patentability standards They could do so by more
stringently policing the disclosure requirements of 35 USC 112, using better prior art, and getting
full access to the fees that they generate, for example.202
a. Patent Legacies
Here, the PTO’s recent experience with business methods203 may be instructive. In 2000,
the PTO increased the resources dedicated to examination of business methods, in effect
supporting a double review.204 The allowance rate of business method applications dropped
the current fee—may weed out more patents that aren’t being used, but it is unlikely to deter someone considering
spending perhaps 100 times that much to litigate a patent.”)
197
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dramatically, to around 10%.205 However effective this program was, however, however, it had
no impact on patents issued before 2000. As pointed out earlier, patent speculators past and
present tend to use old patents.206
Twelve years later, business method litigations have not subsided. Rather they have
grown. (Figure 3) This is not to say that the better examination doesn’t matter or that the
number of litigations isn’t fewer than they would have been had there been no double review of
business method patents. The point is simply that whatever the PTO does today will not impact
the generation of “legacy patents,” examined under varying conditions and likely of different
quality.208
207

Figure 3:

C. Proposals to Bolster Defenses and Decrease Remedies
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Several proposals have been developed that address the problem of specialized plaintiffs
that are invulnerable to countersuit and seek high-stakes injunctions.
1. An Independent Invention Defense
A popular suggestion has been to create an independent invention defense to patent
infringement.209 Right now, a company that has no knowledge of a patent, and did not learn of
the invention from the patentee can still be sued for patent infringement and asked to stop.210
Introducing an independent invention defense would change this, shielding so-called “innocent”
infringement from liability. Because copying is rarely asserted in patent infringement,211 it is
believed that an independent defense would solve the problem of both holdup and trolls.212 It
would also greatly diminish patent quality problems by preventing obvious inventions from
becoming the patentee’s exclusive domain since others are likely to come up with it on their
own.213
Though it has not been the subject of a serious recent legislative proposal, an innocent
user defense was proposed in the 1880s. The proposal was notably narrower than the defense of
innocent infringement many are now calling for. It would shield innocent buyers of technology
from claims of patent infringement; the patentee could still pursue the manufacturer.214
a. Broad-Sweeping Change
Still, the defense was viewed as undermining the entire patent system and the incentive to
innovate, for the sake of a few.215 It would diminish US competitiveness,216 it was claimed, and
209
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might also disproportionately benefit large corporations,217 who by the virtue of their sales,
arguably had the most to gain from the defense.
Modern commentators have echoed these reservations. The most important inventions
could be delayed or not disclosed.218 Commercialization incentives may also be dampened, as
patentholders would be unable to depend on any assurance of exclusivity.219 The impact of the
cure could potentially be much worse than the disease.220 Many of the details have not been
thought through – where the burden would lie, what kind of proof would be required, the
transferability of the defense, and the differential impact on industries and particular types of
patentholders and defendants.221
An independent invention may not even be available all or perhaps most of the time –
although copying is not often alleged in the courtroom, companies copy each other all the
time.222 Said one boss allegedly, at a social gaming company “I don’t fucking want innovation.
Just copy what they do and do it until you get their numbers.”223 In addition, as Mark Lemley has
pointed out, “copying” a patent that is claimed in functional language can amount to just taking
the idea from another’s product or description, rather than the specific embodiment of the idea.224
While spreading ideas accelerates innovation, such copying would not qualify for the defense.
Can a company that learns of an idea from a third party who copied it from the patentee claim
independent invention? There is no clear answer. These levels of uncertainty have likely
prevented any serious proposals to create an independent invention defense to date.225
b. Towards An Innocent User Defense to Software Patent Infringement?226
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A defense that could accomplish many of the aims of an independent invention defense
and avoid many of its problems is an innocent user defense for software patents. Patentholders
don’t usually sue consumers – it risks alienating potential customers and it is expensive to go
after them one by one. But PAEs don’t have customers and, when they use a nuisance fee model,
can potentially make more money by going after several individual users rather than a single
manufacturer.
But a consumer defense could immunize users like the Red Cross that use off the shelf
technology to solicit donations, small companies that buy PDF machines, and coffee shops that
offer wifi. These types of defendants are not in the business of patents and devising new
technology, their liability arises from using technology and having revenue.
While radical-sounding, an innocent consumer defense is well-precedented. Germany,
France, the UK, Japan, and Canada also feature a non-commercial user defense.227 The United
States also has features a limited user defense: medical doctors using patented surgical methods
have a statutory shield from claims of patent infringement through 35 USC Section 287(c).
A version of an innocent consumer defense could be accomplished in a number of ways.
The legislature could enact such a defense. However, parties could bring, and judges could
favorably rule, on requests to stay cases brought against individual users if a case with the
manufacturer is pending or filed, akin to the Section 18 of the AIA. Parties and courts could also
make and support requests to implead manufacturers as necessary parties to such actions and
suspending users from suits in the meanwhile.
2. Injunctions Reform at the ITC
eBay made it harder for NPEs to get injunctions, reducing much of the leverage district
court patentees used to wield by virtue of the possibility of shutting down the defendant’s
product. But this result can be circumvented by filing qualifying patent cases at the International
Trade Commission (ITC), where injunctions remain readily available. One suggestion has been
to close this “loophole” by making the injunction standard consistent across the ITC and district
courts.
There are a variety of ways that this could be accomplished. Congress could simply
require the ITC to follow eBay, rather than its current standard. Or the ITC could implement the
existing public interest analysis it is required to carry out to reach results that are similar to the
district court applying eBay. It could make greater use of the flexibility it has to award exclusion
orders, in a way that reduces the undue bargaining power associated with an injunction.228 The
ITC domestic industry requirement could be interpreted to exclude from the ITC altogether the
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cases that are the least likely to deserve them under eBay.229 A variety of ITC reform efforts are
being considered that implement these strategies.230
D. Proposals to Reduce the Incentive to Bring Nuisance Suits
1. Increased use of Fee-Shifting/Sanctions in Patent Cases
Fee-shifting has been proposed as one way to deter patent suits that are brought for their
nuisance value.231 “Nuisance suits” have a low expected recovery value - because the patent is
weak or its economic value is low.232 While the low value of the suit would normally deter it - it
doesn't make sense to pay $10 to recover $5 - nuisance suit economics dictate otherwise, because
the high cost of defense increases the likelihood of a favorable settlement.233 (Figure 2) Feeshifting changes the economics by requiring an unsuccessful plaintiff to foot the defendant’s
legal fees, punishing and deterring low-probability claims.
Figure 2: Patent Nuisance Fee Economics234
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Nearly as long as there have been nuisance lawsuits, there have been efforts to deter
them. Fee-shifting statutes can be mandatory or discretionary, one-way or two-way.236 In
Europe, the losing party pays the winning parties’ expenses and fees under the so-called “English
Rule,”237 a two-way mandatory shift. In order to increase access to justice,238 the US has enacted
fee-shifting rules that favor plaintiffs in public interest and civil rights contexts.239 Alaska has
adopted the English rule generally,240 and a handful of other states have some version of
mandatory fee-shifting in narrow contexts.241 But they are the exception rather than the rule. In
the US, courts generally must determine independently of the merits of the overall case whether
one party has behaved badly enough to be punished.242 Since 1937, for example, Rule 11 has
authorized federal judges to sanction attorneys if they fail to vet a pleading before filing it.243
235

a. Does Fee-Shifting Deter Frivolous Litigation? Theory And Evidence
Fee-shifting rules have long been in place, but have they worked to deter frivolous
litigation?244 The theoretical and empirical literature on fee-shifting has been described as
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“vast”245 and “immense,”246 the latter encompassing simulations, surveys, and theoretical
models.247 However, only a select few of them focus on the specific question of whether feeshifting statutes that intend to deter frivolous litigation (rather than to make it cheaper to bring
meritorious suits, for example) actually do so. Below I summarize the relevant theory and
evidence. Though my summary, like the literature, tends to focus on mandatory fee-shifting,
much of the reasoning extends, albeit with less force, to discretionary regimes as well.
Weak cases are cases that are likely to lose at trial. As Shavell and Rosenberg have
explained, a mandatory fee-shifting regime punishes plaintiffs who bring such cases when they
do in fact lose.248 According to theory, the regime makes defendants more willing to fight than
fold, because the fees they incur will be repaid. Plaintiffs will also be discouraged from bringing
weak cases due to the penalty they will have to pay when they lose.
Yet theorists have pointed out various limitations of the rule. The dynamics described
work best when the penalties cannot be avoided, by the plaintiff going bankrupt for example, and
when weak cases can be identified ahead of time.249 But these predicates are not always present.
Theoretical work by Polinsky and Rubinfield concluded that the English Rule may encourage
plaintiffs who bring cases the basis of weaker claims to go to trial because they know that the
risks associated with erroneous outcome will increase the penalty to the defendant.250 Even if
fee-shifting rules deter frivolous claims, they will also deter meritorious claims.251 According to
critics, the “real losers” are those with credible, but uncertain cases who cannot bear the risk of
paying the opposing party’s costs if, despite the strength of the case, they nonetheless lose in
court.252
Theory and common sense also imply that mandatory fee-shifting has differential impacts
upon different types of plaintiffs and cases. Two-way fee-shifting discourages pessimistic
plaintiffs, who are afraid of having to pay their opponents’ fees but encourages optimistic
plaintiffs, who think they will win, “all expenses paid,”253 so to speak, and also impacts
conservative and risk-taking defendants differently. The decision-making of “one-shotters,”
rather than repeat plaintiffs, and in low-value, as opposed to high value cases, is more likely to
be influenced by the specter of fee-shifting.254 More plainly: the possibility of having to pay over
245
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$1M in attorney’s fees is more likely to influence a single inventor’s decision to assert her patent
against a defendant hoping for a $100,000 judgment than a serial patent assertion entity like NTP
that has recouped over $612M in a single case.255
Turning to the empirical evidence, studies of mandatory two-way fee shifting cannot be
characterized as uniformly encouraging. While proponents of the 'English Rule' credit it with the
perceived relatively lower levels of litigation in Europe as compared to the US,256 several things
undercut a direct inference. A comprehensive study of European fee-shifting statutes basically
concluded that the task of assessing whether it worked was impossible.257 It's difficult to identify
frivolous suits and to control and isolate the impact of the rule as opposed to other differences,
for example.258 European laws don’t necessarily have the deterrent goal in mind. 259
In the United States, Alaska is the only state that has a more or less mandatory version of
fee-shifting. Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 82 states: “except as otherwise provided by law or
agreed to by the parties, the prevailing party in a civil case shall be awarded attorney's fees
calculated under this rule,”260 (emphasis added) and specifies a schedule for the recovery of
fees.261 Two independent studies, one by by Douglas Rennie of 1997-2010 case filings in Alaska
and comparable jurisdictions,262 and the other commissioned by Alaska’s Judicial Council263
failed to find that the fee-shifting policy in Alaska has played a significant role in decreasing
filings.264
In a study published in 1992, Gerald Hess, surveying judges and attorneys in
Washington, found that most believed that FRCP Rule 11 caused attorneys to increase their prefiling inquiries,265 however when asked about the Rule’s impact on filings, 50% of federal judges
and 62% of federal attorneys believed that the Rule had none.266
Section 505 shifts fees in copyright cases, stating that the “court in its discretion may
allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party other than the United States or an officer
thereof. [][T]he court may also award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party as part of
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the costs.”267 This standard is more permissive than Rule 11’s “legally or factually baseless”
standard.268 Implementing Section 505,269 prevailing plaintiffs have gotten 89 percent of their fee
award requests reimbursed,270 and prevailing defendants 61 percent,271 generally based on the
“objective unreasonableness” of the claim.272
Attorney fee judgments have been credited with contributing to the demise of copyright
troll273 Righthaven.274 However, strong fee-shifting laws did not deter prevent the development
of the copyright troll business model,275 and because of the particular facts of the case,276 the
deterrent effect of copyright fee-shifting statutes on this business model are hard to know. Others
believe Section 505 to be limited in its impact due to the divergence in how courts have
interpreted it.277 Prevailing plaintiffs still seem to be favored.278
Thus, fee-shifting statutes seem to make a difference, but the particulars vary, and even
with respect to specific statutes, the impact is hard to measure with any sort of precision.
b.Shifting Fees in Patent Cases
267
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In patent cases, judges may already award attorney's fees in patent cases when the
circumstances are “exceptional” (35 USC 285),279 and in other situations.280 Attorneys fees are
awarded infrequently: from 2005-2011, there were on average 50 awards per year;281 in
comparison to around 3,000 patent case filings on average per year.282 The majority of the
attorney fee awards are made in cases that go to trial.283 The rule doesn’t favor either side, and
slightly less than half of the awards are to prevailing defendants.284
One way defendant favorable fee-shifting in patent cases has been proposed285 as a way
to counter nuisance patent suits generally and more specifically, the dramatic increase in troll
litigation.286 In the historical era, an agrarian patent reform proposal would have shifted fees in
favor of the defendant in low-value suits, even where the plaintiff prevailed: “[i]f the plaintiff
shall not recover the sum of $20 or over, the court shall adjudge him to pay his own costs, unless
[infringement was knowing].”287 Similarly, a recent proposal would shift fees when the cost of
the offense is greater than provable damages, to encourage settlement and discourage nuisance
litigation.288 These types of proposal are analogous to “offer of judgment” rules such as Rule
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68289 that penalize plaintiffs who reject settlement offers greater than the value of the courtdetermined judgment.290
Other reform proposals have aligned the reward of fees more closely with actual defeat in
the courtroom. In 2006, a precursor bill to the America Invents Act would have placed a heavy
thumb on the scale in favor of awarding attorney’s fees to prevailing parties, “unless the court
finds that the position of the non-prevailing party or parties was substantially justified or that
special circumstances make an award unjust.”291 In 2011, Judge Rader appeared to urge use of
fee-shifting authority in nuisance fee cases, “when the case is over and the court can identify a
troll or a grasshopper, I strongly advocate full-scale reversal of attorney fees and costs!”292
The 2012 SHIELD Act features a one-way shift in favor defendants:
“[I]n an action disputing the validity or alleging the infringement of a computer hardware
or software patent, upon making a determination that the party alleging the infringement
of the patent did not have a reasonable likelihood of succeeding, the court may award the
recovery of full costs to the prevailing party, including reasonable attorney's fees, other
than the United States.” 293
Though this particular bill does not change the discretionary nature of Section 285, it
does change the standard for awards and limits this change to high-tech patent cases when
plaintiffs lose. On its face, there is much to like about the Act – it is narrowly tailored, purporting
to apply only to cases involving high-tech cases, as NPE cases overwhelmingly are.294 It applies
only ones where cases are brought despite the weakness of the patent. Though the reforms would
extend beyond troll plaintiffs, it is hard to argue that fees should not be paid in such
circumstances.
c. The Differential Impact of Fee-Shifting on Different Patent Trolls and Tactics
As noted earlier, some commentators believe one-off plaintiffs are more sensitive to fee289
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shifting, and repeat players, less sensitive to fee-shifting.295 However, trolls suits are
overwhelmingly brought by serial NPEs and professional licensing entities, according to data
from RPX. Inventor suits, which are the types that are most likely to fit into the “one-off”
category comprise only 18% of suits and 12% of NPE defendants.296
On the other hand, fee-shifting is likely to change the willingness of both patentees and
lawyers to enter into contingent-fee representation. Because it reduces out-of-pocket costs for the
plaintiff, contingent fee representation of patent plaintiffs is popular.297 But fee-shifting raises the
stakes in a way that may discourage contingent-fee funded patent suits. In the absence of feeshifting, a contingent fee lawyer has little to lose from bringing a patent case, except his time.
But regulations that would shift fees to the lawyer upon loss mean that if the contingent fee
lawyer loses, he’ll lose much more than his time. The impact of statutes that shift fees to parties
is similar. Parties use contingent fee representation to protect themselves from the risk of loss of
legal fees with no upside if they lose. But under a fee-shifting regime, they are exposed to the
risk of not only losing but paying the other side’s fees. Because of the indeterminacy of patent
law, contingency economics are likely going to be impacted, even when the cases brought appear
to be strong.298
d. The Definitional Challenge- Identifying Patent Nuisance Suits
For a fee-shifting rule to deter frivolous litigation requires there to be a consistent
understanding of when litigation is frivolous. In Eon-Net case, the Federal Circuit cited a variety
of tactics to support its confirmation that the plaintiff’s case was objectively baseless.299 Judge
Davis has also warned that suits where the theory of recovery is based on the “cost of defense”
deserve to be sanctioned. 300
However, it’s often hard to determine when fee-shifting warranted under a discretionary
standard. In his study of fee-shifting statutes throughout European, Werner Pfenningstorf
observed that when costs are imposed only in the case of bad faith, rather than automatically,
courts are reluctant to find make the requisite finding and rarely order the payment of fees.301
This finding that is consistent with the infrequent use of the exceptional cases rule of 35 USC
Section 285.302 Concerns about whether fee-shifting is over or under-deterring cases has also
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plagued Rule 11, causing it to be significantly watered down in the early1990s.303
Dividing cases into ones that “did not have a reasonable likelihood of succeeding” and
those that did as is required by the SHIELD Act would likely also prove difficult. Although
studies suggest that trolls overwhelmingly lose at trial,304 the indeterminacy of patent law305
makes it hard to determine ex ante which cases are not going to be successful and which are.
Some cases that could fall into the category include situation where the invalidating prior art is
known before trial,306 the patent has been invalidated in another forum like the International
Trade Commission307 or abroad, or the patentee has committed inequitable conduct. But such
instances are few and far between, and would exclude many troll cases.
Frivolousness, reasonableness, and exceptional-ness are in the eye of the beholder.308
e. Scope
In addition, fee-shifting does not punish tactics and abuses outside of the courtroom
where the majority of assertions take place. Rather, fee-shifting generally only takes place only
after a case has been decided or at least filed. The ratio between demands and lawsuits can be
large. According to one account, troll E-Data sued 43 companies but offered licenses to at least
25,000 others.309
Based on talking to lawyers who assert other forms of IP, Bill Gallagher has concluded
that “legal sanctions aimed at deterring over-reaching IP enforcement are unlikely to be effective
because most such over-reaching occurs in informal disputing processes outside of the legal
system.”310 The fees companies spend analyzing and worrying about cease and desist letters and
negotiating with patentholders cannot be recouped through fee-shifting provisions that apply to
litigation expenses.
f. Circumvention and Avoidance
Perhaps the most damning critique of loser pays rules is that they potentially can be
circumvented. More sophisticated trolls bring suits using shell companies created for the
303
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specific purpose of shielding their investors from liability and scrutiny.311 Structured correctly,
the entity need not be connected to the corporation’s sponsors or its assets. Faced with a sanction
or attorney’s fee award against it, the LLC could go bankrupt rather than paying the penalty. In
Europe, for example, German patent troll IP Com is structured as a special purpose entity (SPE)
designed to be “judgment proof” from fee awards against it.312 If fee-shifting awards and
sanctions can be avoided in this way, they will be. Indeed, such concerns apparently have already
provided an incentive for them to be set up in this way:313Acacia has established subsidiaries to
handle its litigations so that “the original patent owners- and other partner companies- are
shielded from risk” and Intellectual Ventures incorporates a different shell for each of its patent
purchases.314
i. Circumvention and the Misjoinder Rules
Circumvention in cost-reduction regulation has been attempted in the application of the
new misjoinder rules. Trolls like to sue multiple defendants at once, both because it is cheaper to
sue once rather than file separate actions and also because it gives defendants less time to present
their cases, especially in districts that do not increase the amount of time available by the number
of defendants.315 The “misjoinder rules” of the 2011 America Invents Act limits who can be sued
in a single patent infringement action, to parties who are engaged in the “same accused product
or process.”316
When it became clear that the AIA and the misjoinder provisions would be going into
effect, non-practicing entities (NPEs) rushed to the courthouse, filing an all-time high number of
cases against a record number of defendants.317 This seemed to provide an early positive
indication that the new rule would matter, by making it harder for patentees to capture the
economies of scale associated with suing a large of number of defendants at the same time.
The early results are mixed, but encouraging. While NPE case filings are up,318 the
number of average defendants per NPE suit is down, from five to two.319 Taking both of these
trends into account by counting total NPE defendants indicates a downward trend thus far
(Figure 4). According to data collected by RPX Corporation, the average number of NPE
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defendants per week in high technology sectors prior to passage of the AIA was 67,320 and since
then through the end of January 2012, was down to 37.321 There are early indications that trolls
are concentrating their efforts on bigger fry.322
However, the misjoinder provisions do not extend to the International Trade
Commission, where patentees can also bring infringement actions. As would be expected, there
is no indication thus far that the same decline in number of defendants per suit experienced in the
district court will be experienced there.323
The misjoinder rules require codefendants to be engaged in the “same accused product or
process.”324 This makes it harder to bring cases against disparate clients that are developing or
using different products. However, it does not preclude suits brought against a group of
defendants all using the same product. For example, Innovatio, LLC has sued hotels and coffee
shops for their use of wireless technology.325
Whether through fee-shifting or other proposals, the possibly of circumvention must be
given serious consideration.
2. Decreasing the Costs of Litigation
The problem may in fact not be the idea that patentees should be compensated, but how
such compensation is accomplished. It is estimated that only a small fraction of the loss
associated with NPEs is returned to innovators and their shareholders.326 As has written about
tort law, where nuisance suits have also been perceived as a problem, perhaps the problem is not
excessive litigation but the systematic “undercompensation of victims and overcompensation of
lawyers.”327
a. Judicial Innovation
A host of proposals fall under the category of streamlining and reducing the high costs of
patent litigation. Much of this is within the power of the judiciary, to, for example, order early
mediation/alternative dispute resolution procedures, limit the number of claims and issues in a
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case,328 and request early disclosure of the value of the case.329 Perhaps the best developed
proposal is the model e-Discovery order promulgated by the Federal Bar Association’s Advisory
Council and adopted by several districts in various forms.330
Although these proposals have the potential to sweep across cases, judges have the
discretion to implement them as they see fit. Importantly, they are well-aligned with judicial
incentives to enhance the efficient resolution of cases. As forum-shopping has been tightened up,
they have the potential to reduce the cost of defense, and therefore the economic opportunity
offered by nuisance litigation. (Figure 2)
b. Market-Based Innovation
RPX Corporation aims to introduce efficiency to patent assertion by “providing a rational
alternative to traditional litigation strategy for our clients, offering defensive buying, acquisition
syndication, patent intelligence, and advisory services.”331 This value proposition has proven
compelling to its 100+ members, who pay a subscription fee every year to access the market
intelligence and services of the firm. 332 IPXI launched in 2012 and also has the objective of
reducing legal intermediaries by offering companies the ability to buy patent rights on an
exchange. By selling Unit Licensing Rights (ULR) contracts, the firm hopes to connect buyers
and sellers of technology rights, avoiding the need for costly enforcement campaigns.333 Though
it is still early, in May 2012 the exchange had 27 “offering” members.334
E. Self-Help
Yet another way to change the patent system is to change the behavior of patentees and
328
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the targets of patent demands, rather than changing the law.335 The “lever” of behavioral change
is an often overlooked force within the patent system, but its impact has been profound. In
general, social norms matter tremendously to how the law is received and interpreted, 336 and the
patent system is no different.
1. Demonstration Effects
For years, companies acquired patents defensively because they saw others doing so, as
part of the patent arms race.337 Demonstration effects in the offensive use of patents have also
been instrumental as innovations in patent assertion have been quickly copied.338 Though it was
once “unforgiveable sin” and “anathema”339 for operating companies to sell patents, this taboo
has been dismantled as prominent companies and critics of patent trolls have engaged in doing
so.340 Likewise, competitors suing each other has apparently become more commonplace.341
Each of these developments, it can be argued, though enabled by the law, was not spurred by it,
but rather shifts in patterns of behavior within the patent systems.
Twitter’s “innovator patent assignment”342 and the “defensive patent license”343
introduced by Shultz and Urban represent recent efforts to stem the flow of patents to patent
trolls by tweaking social norms.344 RPX Corporation provides a collective, market-based solution
to patent problems by buying up threatening patents on behalf of groups of its members, at a
fraction of the price.345 The Coalition for Patent Fairness lobbies for changes to patent law on
behalf of companies in the financial services, technology, energy, and related industries.346
Elsewhere I have suggested the creation of a defensive non-profit entity347 that could focus, for
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example, primarily on challenging patents.
2. Farmer and Railroad Groups
During the agrarian patent crisis, farmer groups, led primarily by various state and
National Grange associations, called on the states and Congress to change the law.348 They tried
to minimize the damage caused by particular patents,349 and through their publications,
publicized information about suits and tactics350 and educated farmers who were generally knew
little about patent law. Though their lobbying efforts resulted in many unsuccessful bills, it is
likely that they sensitized the Courts and Congress to the problems patents created for farmers
and eventually resulted in the changes.
Railroad associations also mounted formidable and professional self-help efforts on
behalf of their members. The Eastern and Western Railroad Associations (ERA and WRA)
offered a variety of defensive patent services to their members including discounted patenting
services, patent clearance, fighting particular patent threats, and lobbying. 351 The railroads paid
fees, assessed in proportion to earnings for these services but also made other commitments – to
share information and coordinate legal strategies – as a condition of their membership.352
The associations counted among their members “nearly all companies” 353 and were so
effective at enlisting them to document technical developments that they could “readily establish
precedence and undermine broad claims pertaining to virtually every aspect of technology.”354
This allowed them to challenge the validity of patents asserted against their members. Because
they included most members of the industry, the associations were able to present a “united
front” in their dealings with patent holders.355
The associations compelled their members to behave in a way supportive of the
collective, rather than just the private, good. To undermine the “divide and conquer” approach of
patent speculators, the ERA set up sanctions against their own members if they “negotiated their
own agreements with holders of disputed patents.”356 If they settled individually rather than
collectively, the railroads risked losing their rights to the association’s defenses. 357
The associations justified these actions on the basis that these deals support patent
speculators and undermined the chance of success in courts. 358 As the ERA announced in its
annual report, “to obtain the best results, the members of the Association must act as a unit [] it is
348

Hayter, supra note __ at 77 (describing the National Grange convention) and 78 (discussing other farmer interest
groups).
349
Id. at 76-77 (describing the efforts of farmer associations to contest patents over the drivewell.”)
350
Id. at e.g. 71 (describing rural publications and their efforts to market themselves to farmers on the basis of the
farmers’ need for information about “patent vendors and swindlers of all kinds.”)
351
Ussselman, Regulating Railroads, supra note ___ at 173.
352
Usselman, Patents Purloined, supra note ___, at 1065-1074.
353
Usselman, Patents Purloined, supra note___ at 1060.
354
Ussselman, Regulating Railroads, supra note ___ at 172.
355
Id.
356
Id.
357
Usselman, Patents Purloined, supra note ___, at 1065-1074.
358
Id. at 173.

45

believed that this unity of action has been the true cause of our success heretofore.”359 The
associations were viewed as so effective they were accused of violating antirust laws and being
illegal.360
Though it would likely to difficult to replicate the structure of the railroad associations,361
certain of their successes do provide direct inspiration. The AIA provides a lot more ways to
challenge patents.362 A broad-based non-profit organization like IEEE could consider facilitating
the sharing and pooling of technical information that could be used to take advantage of them.
CONCLUSION
The adage that there is nothing new under the sun363 applies with surprising force to
modern day patent reform. Each reform that is now being proposed – to shift-fees to losing
plaintiffs, to abolish software patents, and to introduce an independent invention defense, for
example – has not only been proposed but tried before in some form. History suggests that
change looks different in hindsight than it does prospectively – in the past, the “abolishment” of
farm patents was accomplished by the ratcheting up of the obviousness standard, and the
effective organization of railroad groups was key to curbing the power of railroad patent sharks,
for example. These and other lessons from the past can help guide, redirect, and reassure current
and future patent reform efforts. They suggest that rather than seek broad-based legislative
change, patent reformers would be well-advised to focus on incremental court and market-based
reforms.
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